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Distance, Power and Ideology: 
Diplomatic Representation in a World of Nation-States 
 
Sending diplomatic missions abroad and receiving foreign missions at home is in the 
political and economic interest of countries. But such missions depend on domestic 
and foreign political will and they also cost scarce resources. This article 
demonstrates that the global pattern of diplomatic representation is significantly 
determined by geographical distance between countries, by the power of both sending 
and recipient countries and by the degree of their ideological affinity. The pattern of 
diplomatic representation is both a reflection of and a contributor to a world of 
nation-states dominated by geographical distance, unequal power and ideological 
division. 
 




Diplomatic representation serves an important function in the international system of 
nation-states. While diplomacy can be achieved by means other than diplomatic 
representation, the presence of an ambassador or chargé d’affaires greatly facilitates 
‘the management of relations between states and between states and other actors’ 
(Barston 2006: 1). Through diplomatic representation states promote their political 
and economic interests, they negotiate, co-ordinate and solve problems, they gather 
information that is not otherwise publicly available, they convey messages to foreign 
representatives, protect their own citizens, facilitate scientific and tourist exchange 
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and do many other things more. More fundamentally, diplomatic representation 
facilitates what critics have called the reification of the state (Abrams 1988), crucial at 
a time when many argue that the concept of sovereign nation-states is under attack in 
an age of globalization (Trouillot 2001; Neumayer 2006). 
Hosting diplomatic representations by foreign nations in one’s own country is 
generally not any less important than establishing one’s diplomatic representation 
abroad. In fact, Small and Singer (1973) take the number of diplomatic missions 
present in a country’s capital as a measure of the present recognised relative 
importance of a state in the international system and a cause of its relative importance 
in the future. 
Considering the importance of one’s own diplomatic representations abroad and 
foreign representations at home, one may think that all countries would set up such 
representation in all other countries of the world. The reality, however, looks very 
different. Only about one third of all possible directed country pairs show evidence of 
diplomatic representation in the period after the Second World War (Bayer 2006). 
Even historically, this rate has rarely been above 50 per cent (as in the beginning of 
the 19th century), despite the international system containing far fewer sovereign 
nation states back then. 
Hence, the question is why states choose to set up diplomatic representation in 
some foreign countries, but not in others. And why are some nation-states much more 
represented abroad than others? Similarly, why do some nation-states host many more 
foreign representations at home than others? Figure 1 gives a graphic representation 
of the number of diplomatic missions sent and received of all countries in the world 
for the year 2005. It demonstrates the very large variation across countries in both the 
number of missions sent and received. 
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There is a surprising gap in the geographical and international relations literature 
on what accounts for this large variation in diplomatic representation. Russett and 
Lamb (1969), Small and Singer (1973), Johns (1979), Nierop (1994) and Vogeler 
(1995) are examples of studies providing anecdotal or more systematic evidence short 
of multivariate quantitative analysis. Xierali and Liu (2006) study the size of foreign 
diplomatic presence as measured by the number of diplomats in multivariate analysis, 
but only for embassies accredited in the United States and for one single year only. 
This article will study bilateral patterns of diplomatic representation over the 
period 1970 to 2005. I argue that three factors exert a strong influence on this pattern: 
distance, power and ideology. Nation-states are much more likely to send an 
ambassador or chargé d’affaires to a country that is geographically close. Countries 
that are economically and militarily more powerful send and receive more diplomatic 
representations than less powerful countries. And, finally, countries that are 
ideologically close to each other are much more likely to enjoy diplomatic exchange. 
In the remainder of this article, I first discuss the importance of diplomatic 
representation. I suggest cost, political will of the potential sending state and the veto 
right of the potential recipient states as obstacles to ubiquitous diplomatic 
representation and identify geographical proximity, power and ideological affinity as 
important determinants of the costs and benefits of representation. This is followed by 
the presentation of multivariate regression results, robustness tests and the concluding 
section. 
 
The Importance of Diplomatic Representation 
Modern diplomacy is as old as the modern international system of sovereign states 
itself, with the first permanent mission having been established by the Duke of Milan 
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at Genoa in the 16th century (Alger and Brams 1966). The nature and role of 
diplomatic representation has changed much during the course of history. The 
promotion of economic interests as well as the protection of one’s citizens travelling 
or living abroad has gained greatly in importance, whereas more traditional functions 
such as the diffusion of security threats and of military tensions have been taken over 
to some extent by the more direct involvement of heads of state and foreign ministers 
(Barston 2006).  
Diplomatic representation is particularly important for the promotion of one’s 
trade interests. Already in 1980, Alan James (1980: 938) noted ‘that many embassies 
spend much of their time on export promotion’. Since then, if anything, this role has 
become more important still. Empirical studies have found that diplomatic exchange 
has a major impact on commercial exchange between countries. Stated succinctly, 
trade follows the flag (Pollins 1989; Rose 2007). 
Critics have argued that the importance of diplomatic exchange is either over-
rated or at least declining over time. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued in 
1970 that if foreign ministries and embassies ‘did not already exist, they surely would 
not have to be invented’ (cited in Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 232). James (1980: 
933) quotes a former ambassador to Britain as saying that ambassadors and embassies 
‘are obsolescent and, if things continue as they are (…) will rapidly become obsolete’. 
Modern communication technology may have indeed rendered some of the 
communication and information gathering functions of diplomatic representations less 
pertinent (Barston 2006). However, the enduring reality of diplomatic exchange 
demonstrates that nation-states continue to appreciate its importance. In fact, as 
Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 233) have pointed out, countries rarely break off 
diplomatic relations, close down embassies or downgrade them to mere consulates 
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other than temporarily, even after revolutionary regime changes at home. The reason 
is simple: ‘In truth, there are few satisfactory alternatives to the resident envoy’ 
(ibid.). 
The very fact that countries use the, often temporary, severing of diplomatic ties 
as a means to communicate an important and strong message to the targeted state 
serves to demonstrate the enduring importance of diplomatic exchange.1 Even in the 
case of temporary or more permanent embassy closure friendly embassies are 
frequently asked to host an interest section where diplomats – other than the 
ambassador – from the closed embassy continue to work in the interest of the country 
(Watson 1984). As Berridge (1994: 38ff.) points out, such interest sections are, 
however, no real substitute for having one’s own embassy. Hence, states are typically 
eager to renew their diplomatic exchange as soon as the temporary period of 
severance has passed. 
 
Obstacles to Diplomatic Representation 
Given the importance of diplomatic representation, why is it not ubiquitous? There 
are three main reasons why a state may not be diplomatically present in all foreign 
countries. One is cost, one is lack of political will, while the third is the veto right of 
the receiving state. Starting with the first reason, the setting up and maintenance of 
diplomatic representations create both capital and current costs. In addition, such 
representations need to be staffed by diplomatic personnel that speak the local 
language and are willing to live in a certain foreign country for a number of years. 
                                                 
1
 As Berridge (1994: 7f.) points out the use of severing diplomatic ties as a signalling device was 
traditionally used as a prelude to war. Nowadays, it is used as a device to send strong signals of 
dissatisfaction without necessarily any military intentions.  
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Yet, even if diplomatic representation abroad were costless, countries would not 
want to open embassies in every other country. Domestic opposition or foreign 
pressure may prevent a country from being represented in a foreign country, usually 
because of ideological reasons. For example, before Nixon went to China and thus 
paved the way for the establishment of an American embassy in Beijing, domestic 
anti-communist opposition prevented American presidents from doing so and likewise 
American pressure on some of its foreign allies prevented them from exchanging 
diplomatic relations with China. Opening diplomatic representation in one country 
can also mean losing it in another. For example, the price for diplomatic relations with 
mainland China is always the loss, if existent, of relations with Taiwan. 
While cost considerations and lack of political will in the sending country imply 
that not all countries would want to be diplomatically represented in all other 
countries, political considerations in the recipient state imply that not all countries 
would be able to open embassies in every other country, even if they could afford and 
wanted to do so. This is because the receiving state can discourage diplomatic 
representation of a particular foreign state in its own country. In its most extreme 
form, it can even refuse to recognise the state that is eager to establish a diplomatic 
representation. Whilst generally rather uncommon, some states such as Israel, North 
Korea and Taiwan or, in the past, Rhodesia and East Germany suffered from more or 
less widespread refusal to recognise its status as an independent, sovereign nation-
state. States that struggle for recognition often use economic incentives to induce 
foreign countries to exchange diplomatic representation. Others, particularly so states, 
which compete with them for diplomatic recognition (such as Western Germany and 
South Korea in the past and China up to this day), use such incentives to dissuade 
these same countries from doing so (Newnham 2000). But even if countries formally 
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recognise each other, they can still signal that the establishment of a formal 
diplomatic representation is unwanted. This forces interested foreign states to either 
open consulates instead, which are usually constrained to perform some low-key 
administrative tasks and are thus no rival to the multiple functions of embassies 
(Berridge 1994), or not to be represented at all. As James (1980: 940) points out ‘an 
embassy is, literally and figuratively, showing the flag’ and some flags are non grata 
in certain foreign countries. 
In one way or another, there are therefore costs and benefits to both sending and 
recipient states considering to open diplomatic representation in each other’s country. 
The costs need to be balanced against the benefits and the benefit-cost ratio will be 
influenced by both factors of the sending state and the potential recipient state as well 
as the relations between them. The benefit-cost ratio will also change over time. There 
is, however, a certain path-dependency in diplomatic representation over time – once 
established, diplomatic representations may persist despite the costs growing larger 
than the benefits. For example, MacRae (1989) attributes the large number of 
diplomatic representations in London partly to such persistence, which perpetuates the 
effect of Britain’s imperial heritage on its current relations. However, the verdict of 
Small and Singer (1973: 582) still holds true: ‘In one way or another, every 
government is faced periodically with the need to estimate, or re-estimate, how 
“important” it is to exchange missions with every other one in the system.’ Nierop 
(1994: 66) similarly argues that patterns of diplomatic representation ‘reflect 
deliberate political action’ and that diplomatic presence is ‘an indication of the 
salience between partners exceeding a certain minimum threshold’. 
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The Costs and Benefits of Diplomatic Representation 
What then determines the costs and benefits of diplomatic representation? This article 
argues that geographical distance, ideological affinity and power status play important 
roles. Countries that are located close to each other typically share many interests and 
are characterised by a high level of mutual interaction. There is often a high degree of 
economic exchange and travel between geographically close countries. Even if 
geographically proximate countries wanted to, it would be very difficult to be 
indifferent to each other. For these reasons, geographical proximity raises the benefits 
from diplomatic representation. It also lowers the cost. It is cheaper to set up and 
maintain embassies in close countries and easier to persuade staff to move to such 
countries, where the climate and culture is similar and home with all its amenities 
(food, media, schools for the children etc.) is not far away. 
One of the functions of diplomatic representation is to maintain and foster 
friendly relations between states. Ideological affinity typically leads to friendly 
relations as sharing a particular view of the world generates a sense of belonging to 
the same group. For example, Western countries share similar views on democracy 
and human rights. Communist countries used to have similar ideas about state 
ownership of the means of production. Predominantly Muslim countries share similar 
ideas about the role of religion in politics. Ideological affinity thus raises the benefits 
of diplomatic representation and promises its smooth functioning given the friendly 
relations it is supposed to maintain, thus also lowering the costs of representation. 
The more powerful countries are the more they wish to be recognized as such by 
other countries. Being represented in a large number of foreign countries as well as 
hosting a large number of foreign countries’ embassies in one’s own country 
symbolises and represents power. However, diplomatic representation goes far 
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beyond the symbolic. If power means exerting an influence on the political, economic 
and military affairs of other countries, then diplomatic representation is an important 
vehicle with which more powerful countries transmit, project and impose their power 
on foreign countries. Conversely, more powerful countries are more interesting hosts 
to foreign countries for their diplomatic representation abroad. It facilitates access to 
those who matter in international affairs. 
Power also qualifies the impact of ideological affinity on diplomatic 
representation. Ideologically close countries share common interests and are therefore 
more likely to exchange diplomatic relations. However, countries with different views 
cannot be simply ignored if they are powerful. Take the relations between Western 
and Communist countries during the Cold War as an example. Smaller Western 
countries may not have had an incentive to send diplomatic relations to smaller 
Communist countries, and vice versa. However, they could not ignore the big players 
in the other camp. Diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China were vital 
for Western countries, powerful or not, while such relations with the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France and perhaps Germany were important even to the less 
powerful Communist countries. Conversely, the big players on either side of the iron 
curtain needed to maintain diplomatic relations with countries of the other side, 
powerful or not, to assert their power status. 
In general, there is a very high degree of reciprocity in diplomatic representation. 
In about 90 per cent of dyads during the period of our study, a pair of countries had 
either no representation in either one or both were represented in each other’s country. 
However, some countries receive or send many more diplomatic representations than 
they send or receive, respectively. For example, during the period of our study, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Kenya and Ethiopia have received many more missions than 
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they have sent abroad. Brussels is attractive because it is the major host of the 
European Union at which countries want to be represented, thus dramatically 
lowering the costs of having full diplomatic relations with Belgium.2 Kenya is a major 
aid recipient, location of Western tourism and host to the only significant United 
Nations organization located outside developed countries. At the other end of the 
spectrum are countries like the two Korean states, which compete for diplomatic 
recognition and are therefore keen to send missions abroad even if the host country 
does not reciprocate. Interestingly, some of the more powerful nations such as China, 
India and Brazil also send more representations abroad than they receive. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Our dependent variable is a directed dyadic dichotomous variable that is set to one if 
there is evidence of the potential sending country having sent either a chargé 
d’affaires, a minister or ambassador to the potential receiving country, and zero 
otherwise.3 Chargé d’affaires and ministers were more commonly used in the past; in 
recent decades ambassadors have become the norm of diplomatic representation. 
Interest sections maintained by other embassies and mere consulate-generals are not 
counted as diplomatic representation and are thus coded as zero. The data have been 
collected by Bayer (2006) and exist for every five-year period between 1970 and 
                                                 
2
 The European Union represents a very special case, being the only supra-national entity to send and 
receive diplomatic missions. 
3
 Ideally, one would like to measure not just the presence or absence of diplomatic representation, but 
also its size. However, no such data exist for a global sample. 
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2005.4 Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, we use a logit 
estimator (probit leads to very similar results). The observations are clustered at the 
dyadic level to ensure that the estimations are robust to both arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Our main explanatory concepts are distance, power and ideology. The first is 
measured by the natural log of the air distance in kilometres between the capital cities 
of the two countries, with data taken from Bennett and Stam (2003).5 To capture the 
power dimension, we take the first principal component of a measure of military and 
of economic power. Military power is measured by the widely used Composite Index 
of National Capacity (CINC) score, taken from the Correlates of War project 
(www.correlatesofwar.org/), first pioneered by Singer, Bremer and Stukey (1972). A 
country’s CINC score is a composite measure of its total population, urban 
population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and 
military expenditure. Economic power is approximated by the natural log of a 
country’s total GDP in constant US$, with data taken from Maddison (2007). 
Ideological affinity cannot be measured directly. As a proxy for it, we use 
Gartzke’s (2006) affinity of nations index. The index is based on voting behaviour in 
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. It is based on a conceptualisation of two 
political positions as falling within a space defined by all the possible political 
                                                 
4
 From 1985, the data only count diplomatic representation if the ambassador or equivalent is 
physically resident in the recipient country, whereas before he or she could also reside in neighbouring 
countries. Results are not affected by restricting the sample to the period 1985 to 2005 only. 
5
 A small minority of diplomatic representations are not located in the capital, but in another city of the 
country. No attempt was made to adjust the distance measure for these cases. The reason is that the 
variable measures the distance between the political centres of the dyad, not the distance between the 
actual locations of diplomatic missions. 
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positions. The index is constructed such that the affinity between any two nations at 
any point in time falls in the interval from -1 to 1, where -1 means that two political 
positions are as far apart in the space as possible (complete dissimilarity, i.e. voting 
contrary in each instance) and 1 means that the two political positions are identical 
(complete similarity, i.e. voting identically in each instance). Gartzke (2006) argues 
that because of the often symbolic nature of UN General Assembly votes, such voting 
behaviour provides a good approximation to revealed state preferences and the voting 
similarity thus offers a good approximation to ideological affinity. It is of course not a 
perfect measure, but it is consistent with basic a priori expectations about the 
ideological affinity of nations. For example, during the Cold War period Western and 
Communist states voting behaviour was quite dissimilar, whereas the voting amongst 
the respective allies was quite similar. To account for our theoretical argument that 
ideological affinity only plays a role if the potential receiving or sending countries are 
not very powerful, we interact the power variables with the ideological affinity 
variable. 
In terms of control variables, we include the natural log of per capita income of 
both sending and receiving states (data from Maddison 2007). Richer sending 
countries are in a better position to afford diplomatic representation abroad. Richer 
receiving countries are of potential greater interest to sending countries. Second, in an 
early contribution, Brams (1966) suggested that, besides geographical proximity, 
colonial ties play an important role in patterns of diplomatic exchange. We include a 
dummy variable to account for former colonial links between states, also counting the 
link between the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Union republics as this 
amounts to a quasi-former colonial relationship. Data are taken from Neumayer 
(2003). Third, due to inertia and persistence in the system of diplomatic 
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representation, countries which have been independent for a longer period of time can 
be expected to have generated a greater number of representations over time, both 
abroad and domestically. To control for this possibility, we include the year of 
independence of both sending and receiving states, with data taken from Gleditsch 
and Ward (1999). Finally, to account for common time trends affecting all countries’ 
propensity to send or receive diplomatic representation equally, we include period-
specific time dummies in the estimations. Table 1 provides descriptive statistical 
information on the variables. Note that for each period the respective value at the 
beginning of the period was taken for each of the explanatory variables. 
 
Results 
Table 2 presents the estimation results. As expected, geographical distance matters: 
more proximate countries are more likely to open a diplomatic representation than 
more distant countries. Also in line with theory, the power status of both sending and 
recipient country exert a significantly positive effect on the likelihood of diplomatic 
presentation. Mower powerful countries are both more likely to send missions abroad 
and more likely to receive missions. The former effect is slightly stronger, but the 
confidence intervals of the two estimated coefficients overlap, so the difference is not 
statistically significant. Ideological affinity makes diplomatic representation more 
likely. However, as expected, the negative coefficients of the interaction effects 
between power of both sending and recipient states and their degree of affinity 
suggests that the positive effect of ideological affinity is decreasing as the power of 
either recipient or sending states increases. In fact, whereas the probability of having a 
diplomatic representation in a country of average power goes down by .05 as 
ideological affinity goes down from average to minimum, holding all other variables 
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at their mean, there is no negative effect of decreasing ideological affinity for a very 
powerful potential recipient country.6 A very similar result holds true for power status 
of a potential sending country. What this means is that ideological affinity has a 
positive effect on the likelihood of diplomatic representation as long as neither the 
potential sending nor the potential recipient state is very powerful. 
As for the control variables, GDP per capita in both sending and recipient 
countries exerts a positive influence on the likelihood of diplomatic representation, as 
expected. The confidence intervals overlap, so there is no statistically significant 
difference between the two variables. Former colonial ties do not have a statistically 
significant effect on patterns of diplomatic representation. The pseudo R2 of the 
model is 0.29, which is relatively high, suggesting that the model provides a relatively 
good fit to the pattern of diplomatic representation. About 81 per cent of observations 
are correctly classified. That is, for about 8 out of 10 observations the model correctly 
predicts the presence or absence of diplomatic representation. 
In column II, we add a dummy variable for diplomatic representation of the 
potential receiving country in the potential sending country. In other words, it is set to 
one if the potential receiving country has itself established a diplomatic mission in the 
potential sending country, and zero otherwise. This variable is a-theoretical, but it can 
control for the very strong degree of reciprocity in diplomatic relations, which, as 
mentioned already, is close to 90 per cent. Naturally, the coefficient of this variable is 
highly statistically significant and it pushes the Pseudo R2 up to 0.5. About 88 per 
cent of observations are now correctly classified. Interestingly, despite absorbing an 
enormous amount of variation in the data, the results from column I nevertheless by 
                                                 
6
 This cannot be directly observed from the estimation results presented in table 2, but can be derived 
from predicted values. 
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and large uphold. In particular, geographical distance and power status still matter, 
even though the respective sizes of the coefficients change of course. The ideological 
affinity variable becomes marginally insignificant and its interaction with power of 
the potential sending country more clearly insignificant. 
 
Robustness tests 
Our main result – that the pattern of diplomatic representation is largely shaped by 
geographical proximity, power and ideological affinity – is robust to a number of 
alterations to the model. First, it is robust to adding further explanatory variables. For 
example, one can account for the inertia in the system of diplomatic representation by 
including a lagged dependent variable. The pseudo R2 rises quite dramatically to 0.64 
and the percentage of correctly classified observations rises less dramatically to 91.6 
per cent. Importantly, however, while the coefficient sizes change of course in the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable, all the explanatory variables remain 
statistically significant. 
Bilateral trade between countries was not included in the estimations because the 
literature suggests that “trade follows the flag” rather than the other way around. 
However, our results are little affected if we include bilateral trade divided by the 
GDP of the potential sending country, which, as expected, has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient sign.  
Newly independent states typically rush to open diplomatic representations 
abroad (James 1980). As the euphoria vanishes and the budget constraints become 
clearer, some of these representations are closed again. One can test for a non-linear 
effect of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable by additionally including 
its squared term. If we do so for the year of independence of the sending country 
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variable, then we find indeed a non-linear effect. A more recent year of independence 
first raises, but then decreases the likelihood of sending a diplomatic mission to the 
potential recipient country. 
Regime type combinations may affect the pattern of diplomatic representation. If 
we employ the commonly used Polity IV measure of democracy, then pairs of 
democracies and pairs of autocracies are more likely to exchange diplomatic missions 
than if one of the country is democratic and the other is autocratic, the omitted 
reference category. These regime type combinations are correlated with the 
ideological affinity variable, but nevertheless the results uphold. 
Second, I divided the sample into a Cold War and post-Cold War period, but 
found that the results are very much the same in both periods. This corroborates the 
finding that these are fundamental and persistent determinants of diplomatic 
representation. 
Third, our main result is also robust to using a probit, random-effects logit or 
population-averaged logit estimator instead of the standard logit estimator with 
clustered standard errors. Given the high degree of persistence in diplomatic relations 
there is relatively little variation over time compared to the cross-dyadic variation. It 
is therefore not surprising that fixed-effects logit estimation is very inefficient, 
rendering most of the explanatory variables statistically insignificant. 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis presented here suggests reasons why we have not seen, nor are likely to 
see in the near future, a decline in the extent and importance of diplomatic 
representation. Diplomatic representation is beneficial to both sending and recipient 
countries. More fundamentally, the substance and symbolism of diplomatic missions 
17 
is crucial in defending the precarious role of the state in an era of globalization. 
Diplomatic representation fulfils an important function in maintaining and reinforcing 
the modern system of sovereign nation-states. 
Diplomatic representation is also costly, however, in both narrow economic and 
wider political terms, which prevents countries from sending missions to and 
receiving missions from all other countries. This study has demonstrated that the 
pattern of diplomatic representation is shaped to a significant extent by geographical 
proximity, power and ideological affinity. Yet, given its important political and 
economic functions, diplomatic representation in turn also reinforces the tyranny of 
geographical distance, the inequality of power and the division of countries along 
ideological lines. The pattern of diplomatic representation is thus both a reflection of 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistical variable information. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dipl. representation of sending at recipient country 111705 0.327 0.469 0 1 
ln Distance 111705 8.254 0.704 3.951 9.421 
Power princ. component (recipient country) 111705 -0.100 1.022 -2.294 4.899 
Power princ. component (sending country) 111705 -0.094 1.023 -2.294 4.899 
Ideological affinity 111705 0.725 0.263 -0.568 1 
Ideology * Power (recipient country) 111705 -0.156 0.722 -2.465 4.693 
Ideology * Power (sending country)) 111705 -0.150 0.725 -2.465 4.693 
ln GDP per capita (recipient country) 111705 7.971 1.090 5.384 10.469 
ln GDP per capita (sending country) 111705 7.971 1.089 5.384 10.469 
Colonial link 111705 0.637 0.481 0 1 
Dipl. representation of recipient at sending country 111705 0.327 0.469 0 1 
Bilateral trade (% of sending country GDP) 111705 0.00 0.01 0 1.16 
Year of independence 111705 1934.45 47.55 1816 1993 
Democratic dyad 103949 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Autocratic dyad 103949 0.37 0.48 0 1 
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Table 2. Estimation results. 
 (1) (2) 
ln Distance -0.155 -0.076 
 (12.36)* (5.03)* 
Power princ. component (recipient country) 1.365 0.607 
 (14.80)* (12.23)* 
Power princ. component (sending country) 1.503 0.803 
 (14.53)* (12.54)* 
Ideological affinity 0.190 0.093 
 (3.06)* (1.38) 
Ideology * Power (recipient country) -0.466 -0.168 
 (4.07)* (2.67)* 
Ideology * Power (sending country)) -0.454 0.025 
 (3.54)* (0.31) 
ln GDP per capita (recipient country) 0.194 0.147 
 (11.00)* (7.63)* 
ln GDP per capita (sending country) 0.155 0.061 
 (8.90)* (3.35)* 
Colonial link 0.006 0.011 
 (0.36) (0.55) 
Dipl. representation of recipient at sending country  3.183 
  (99.85)* 
Constant -2.117 -2.979 
 (8.07)* (10.19)* 
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.50 
Correctly classified 80.6% 87.8% 
# countries 155 155 
Observations (country dyads) 111705 111705 
 
Note: Logit estimation with standard errors clustered on country dyads. Period-
specific time dummies included, but coefficients not reported. Absolute z-statistics in 
parentheses. 




Figure 1. Diplomatic missions sent to (top panel) and received from other countries (bottom panel) 
in 2005. Note: darker colours represent higher numbers (divided into five equal intervals each). 
